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Abstract
In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches
against each other and the outcome of the games is measured on a cardinal scale
with a lower and upper bound. An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of
ranking the competitors. Self-consistency requires assigning the same rank for play-
ers with equivalent results, while a player showing an obviously better performance
than another should be ranked strictly higher. According to order preservation, if
two players have the same pairwise ranking in two tournaments where the same
players have played the same number of matches, then their pairwise ranking is
not allowed to change in the aggregated tournament. We reveal that these two
properties cannot be satisfied simultaneously on this universal domain.
JEL classification number: C44, D71
MSC class: 91A80, 91B14
Keywords: tournament ranking; paired comparison; axiomatic approach; impossibil-
ity
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of tournament ranking when players may have played
an arbitrary number of matches against each other, from an axiomatic point of view. For
instance, the matches among top tennis players lead to a set of similar data: Andre Agassi
has played 14 matches with Boris Becker, but he has never played against Bjo¨rn Borg
(Bozo´ki et al., 2016). To be more specific, we show the incompatibility of some natural
∗ e-mail: laszlo.csato@uni-corvinus.hu
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properties. Impossibility theorems are well-known in the classical theory of social choice
(Arrow, 1950; Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), but our setting has a crucial difference:
the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide, therefore the transitive effects of
’voting’ should be considered (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008). We also allow for cardinal
and incomplete preferences as well as ties in the ranking derived.
Several characterizations of ranking methods have been suggested in the literature
by providing a set of properties such that they uniquely determine a given method
(Rubinstein, 1980; Bouyssou, 1992; Bouyssou and Perny, 1992; van den Brink and Gilles,
2003, 2009; Slutzki and Volij, 2005, 2006; Kitti, 2016). There are some excellent axiomatic
analyses, too (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998; Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014).
However, apart from Csato´ (2018b), we know only one work discussing impossibil-
ity results for ranking the nodes of a directed graph (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008),
a domain covered by our concept of generalized tournament. We think these theorems
are indispensable for a clear understanding of the axiomatic framework. For example,
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) have found that most ranking methods violate an axiom called
order preservation, but it is not known whether this negative result is caused by a theor-
etical impossibility or it is only due to some hidden features of the procedures that have
been considered.
It is especially a relevant issue because of the increasing popularity of sports rank-
ings (Langville and Meyer, 2012), which is, in a sense, not an entirely new phenomenon,
since sports tournaments have motivated some classical works of social choice and voting
theory (Landau, 1895; Zermelo, 1929; Wei, 1952). For instance, the ranking of tennis
players has been addressed from at least three perspectives, with the use of methods from
multicriteria decision-making (Bozo´ki et al., 2016), network analysis (Radicchi, 2011), or
statistics (Baker and McHale, 2014, 2017). Consequently, the axiomatic approach can
be fruitful in the choice of an appropriate sports ranking method. This issue has been
discussed in some recent works (Berker, 2014; Pauly, 2014; Csato´, 2017, 2018a,c,d,e,f,g;
Dagaev and Sonin, 2017; Vaziri et al., 2018; Vong, 2017), but there is a great scope for
future research.
For this purpose, we will place two properties, imported from the social choice liter-
ature, in the centre of the discussion. Self-consistency (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997)
requires assigning the same rank for players with equivalent results, furthermore, a player
showing an obviously better performance than another should be ranked strictly higher.
Order preservation1 (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014) excludes the possibility of rank reversal
by demanding the preservation of players’ pairwise ranking when two tournaments, where
the same players have played the same number of matches, are aggregated. In other words,
it is not allowed that player A is judged better both in the first and second half of the
season than player B, but ranked lower on the basis of the whole season.
Our main result proves the incompatibility of self-consistency and order preservation.
This finding gives a theoretical foundation for the observation of Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.
(2014) that most ranking methods do not satisfy order preservation. Another important
message of the paper is that prospective users cannot avoid to take similar impossibilities
into account and justify the choice between the properties involved.
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the notion of ranking problem
and scoring methods. Section 3 introduces the property called self-consistency and proves
1 The term order preservation may be a bit misleading since it can suggest that the sequence of
matches does not influence the rankings (see Vaziri et al. (2018, Property III)). This requirement obviously
holds in our setting.
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that one type of scoring methods cannot satisfy it. Section 4 defines (strong) order
preservation besides some other properties, addresses the compatibility of the axioms and
derives a negative result by opposing self-consistency and order preservation. Section 5
summarizes our main findings.
2 The ranking problem and scoring methods
Consider a set of players N = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, n ∈ N+ and a series of tournament
matrices T (1), T (2), . . . , T (m) containing information on the paired comparisons of the
players. Their entries are given such that t
(p)
ij + t
(p)
ji = 1 if players Xi and Xj have played
in round p (1 ≤ p ≤ m) and t
(p)
ij + t
(p)
ji = 0 if they have not played against each other
in round p. The simplest definition can be t
(p)
ij = 1 (implying t
(p)
ji = 0) if player Xi has
defeated player Xj , and t
(p)
ij = 0 (implying t
(p)
ji = 1) if player Xi has lost against player Xj
in round p. A draw can be represented by t
(p)
ij = t
(p)
ji = 0.5. The entries may reflect the
scores of the players, or other features of the match (e.g. an overtime win has less value
than a normal time win), too.
The tuple
(
N, T (1), T (2), . . . , T (m)
)
, denoted shortly by (N,T), is called a general rank-
ing problem. The set of general ranking problems with n players (|N | = n) is denoted by
T n.
The aggregated tournament matrix A =
∑m
p=1 T
(p) = [aij ] ∈ R
n×n combines the results
of all rounds of the competition.
The pair (N,A) is called a ranking problem. The set of ranking problems with n players
(|N | = n) is denoted by Rn. Note that every ranking problem can be associated with
several general ranking problems, in this sense, ranking problem is a narrower notion.
Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems with the same player set N . The
sum of these ranking problems is (N,A + A′) ∈ Rn. For example, the ranking problems
can contain the results of matches in the first and second half of the season, respectively.
Any ranking problem (N,A) has a skew-symmetric results matrix R = A − A⊤ =
[rij ] ∈ R
n×n and a symmetric matches matrix M = A + A⊤ = [mij ] ∈ N
n×n. mij is the
number of matches between players Xi and Xj, whose outcome is given by rij. Matrices
R and M also determine the aggregated tournament matrix through A = (R + M)/2,
so any ranking problem (N,A) ∈ Rn can be denoted analogously by (N,R,M) with the
restriction |rij| ≤ mij for all Xi, Xj ∈ N . Despite description with results and matches
matrices is not parsimonious, this notation will turn out to be useful.
A general scoring method is a function g : T n → Rn. Several procedures have been
suggested in the literature, see Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) for an overview of them.
A special type of general scoring methods is the following.
Definition 2.1. Individual scoring method (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1999): A general
scoring method g : T n → Rn is called individual scoring method if it is based on indi-
vidual scores, that is, there exist functions φ and δ such that for any general ranking
problem (N,T) ∈ T n, the corresponding score vector s = g(N,T) can be expressed as
s = δ(s(1), s(2), . . . , s(m)), where the partial score vectors s(p) = φ(N, T (p)) depend solely
on the tournament matrix T (p) of round p for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m.
A scoring method is a function f : Rn → Rn. Any scoring method can also be regarded
as a general scoring method – by using the aggregated tournament matrix instead of the
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whole series of tournament matrices –, therefore some articles only consider scoring meth-
ods (Kitti, 2016; Slutzki and Volij, 2005). Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) give a thorough
axiomatic analysis of certain scoring methods.
In other words, scoring methods initially aggregate the tournament matrices and then
rank the players by their scores, while individual scoring methods first give scores to the
players in each round and then aggregate them.
3 An argument against the use of individual scoring
methods
In this section, some properties of general scoring methods are presented, which will
highlight an important failure of individual scoring methods.
3.1 Universal invariance axioms
Axiom 3.1. Anonymity (ANO): Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem, σ :
{1, 2, . . . , m} → {1, 2, . . . , m} be a permutation on the set of rounds, and σ(N,T) ∈ T n
be the ranking problem obtained from (N,T) by permutation σ. General scoring method
g : T n → Rn is anonymous if gi(N,T) = gi (σ(N,T)) for all Xi ∈ N .
Anonymity implies that any reindexing of the rounds (tournament matrices) preserves
the scores of the players.
Axiom 3.2. Neutrality (NEU): Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem, σ : N →
N be a permutation on the set of players, and (σ(N),T) ∈ T n be the ranking problem
obtained from (N,T) by permutation σ. General scoring method g : T n → Rn is neutral
if gi(N,T) = gσ(i)(σ(N),T) for all Xi ∈ N .
Neutrality means that the scores are independent of the labelling of the players.
3.2 Self-consistency
Now we want to formulate a further requirement on the ranking of the players by answering
the following question: When is player Xi undeniably better than player Xj? There are
two such plausible cases: (1) if player Xi has achieved better results against the same
opponents; (2) if player Xi has achieved the same results against stronger opponents.
Consequently, player Xi should also be judged better if he/she has achieved better results
against stronger opponents than player Xj . Furthermore, since (general) scoring methods
allow for ties in the ranking, player Xi should have the same rank as player Xj if he/she
has achieved the same results against opponents with the same strength.
In order to apply these principles, both the results and strengths of the players should
be measured. Results can be extracted from the tournament matrices T (p). Strengths of
the players can be obtained from their scores according to the (general) scoring method
used, hence the name of the implied axiom is self-consistency. It has been introduced in
Chebotarev and Shamis (1997), and extensively discussed by Csato´ (2018b).
Definition 3.1. Opponent multiset: Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem. The
opponent multiset2 of player Xi is Oi, which contains mij instances of Xj .
2 Multiset is a generalization of the concept of set allowing for multiple instances of its elements.
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Players of the opponent multiset Oi are called the opponents of player Xi.
Notation 3.1. Consider the ranking problem (N, T (p)) ∈ T n given by restricting a general
ranking problem to its pth round. Let Xi, Xj ∈ N be two different players and h
(p) :
O
(p)
i ↔ O
(p)
j be a one-to-one correspondence between the opponents of Xi and Xj in
round p, consequently, |O
(p)
i | = |O
(p)
j |. Then h
(p) : {k : Xk ∈ O
(p)
i } ↔ {ℓ : Xℓ ∈ O
(p)
j } is
given by Xh(p)(k) = h
(p)(Xk).
Axiom 3.3. Self-consistency (SC) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997): A general scoring
method g : T n → Rn is called self-consistent if the following implication holds for any
general ranking problem (N,T) ∈ T n and for any players Xi, Xj ∈ N : if there exists
a one-to-one mapping h(p) from O
(p)
i onto O
(p)
j such that t
(p)
ik ≥ t
(p)
jh(p)(k)
and gk(N,T) ≥
gh(p)(k)(N,T) for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m and Xk ∈ O
(p)
i , then fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M),
furthermore, fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M) if t
(p)
ik > t
(p)
jh(p)(k)
or gk(N,T) > gh(p)(k)(N,T) for
at least one 1 ≤ p ≤ m and Xk ∈ O
(p)
i .
3.3 Individual scoring methods and self-consistency
In this part, it will be proved that an anonymous and neutral individual scoring method
cannot satisfy self-consistency, which is a natural fairness requirement, thus it is enough
to focus on ranking problems and scoring methods. For this purpose, the example below
will be used.
Figure 1: The general ranking problem of Example 3.1
(a) (N, T (1))
X1 X2
X3X4
(b) (N, T (2))
X1 X2
X3X4
(c) (N,T)
X1 X2
X3X4
Example 3.1. Let
(
N, T (1), T (2)
)
∈ T 4 be a general ranking problem describing a tour-
nament with two rounds.
It is shown in Figure 1: a directed edge from node Xi to Xj indicates a win of player
Xi over Xj (and a loss of Xj against Xi), while an undirected edge from node Xi to Xj
represents a drawn match between the two players. This representation will be used in
further examples, too.
So, player X1 has defeated X4 in the first round (Figure 1.a), while players X2 and
X3 have not played. In the second round, players X1 and X2, as well as players X3 and
X4 have drawn (Figure 1.b). The whole tournament is shown in Figure 1.c.
According to the following result, at least one property from the set of ANO, NEU
and SC will be violated by any individual scoring method.
Proposition 3.1. There exists no anonymous and neutral individual scoring method sat-
isfying self-consistency.
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Proof. Let g : T n → Rn be an anonymous and neutral individual scoring method. Con-
sider Example 3.1. ANO andNEU imply that g2(N, T
(1)) = g3(N, T
(1)) and g2(N, T
(2)) =
g3(N, T
(2)), therefore
g2(N,T) = δ
(
g2(N, T
(1)), g2(N, T
(2))
)
= δ
(
g3(N, T
(1)), g3(N, T
(2))
)
= g3(N,T). (1)
Note that O
(1)
1 = {X4}, O
(1)
1 = {X2} and O
(1)
4 = {X1}, O
(2)
4 = {X3}. Take the one-to-
one correspondences h
(1)
14 : O
(1)
1 ↔ O
(1)
4 such that h
(1)
14 (X4) = X1 and h
(2)
14 : O
(2)
1 ↔ O
(2)
4 such
that h
(2)
14 (X2) = X3. Now t
(2)
12 = t
(2)
43 since the corresponding matches resulted in draws.
Furthermore, t
(1)
14 6= t
(1)
41 since the value of a win and a loss should be different. It can
be assumed without loss of generality that t
(1)
14 > t
(1)
41 . Suppose that g1(N,T) ≤ g4(N,T).
Then players X1 and X4 have a draw against a player with the same strength (X2 and
X3, respectively), but X1 has defeated X4, so it has a better result against a not weaker
opponent. Therefore, self-consistency (Axiom 3.3) implies g1(N,T) > g4(N,T), which is
a contradiction, thus g1(N,T) > g4(N,T) holds.
However, O
(1)
2 = ∅, O
(2)
2 = {X1} and O
(1)
3 = ∅, O
(2)
3 = {X4}. Consider the unique
one-to-one correspondence h
(2)
14 : O
(2)
2 ↔ O
(2)
3 , which – together with t
(2)
21 = t
(2)
34 (the two
draws should be represented by the same number) and g1(N,T) > g4(N,T) – leads to
g2(N,T) > g3(N,T) because player X2 has achieved the same result against a stronger
opponent than player X3. In other words, SC requires the draw of X2 to be more valuable
than the draw of X3, but it cannot be reflected by any individual scoring method g
according to (1).
4 The case of ranking problems and scoring methods
According to Proposition 3.1, only the procedure underlying scoring methods can be
compatible with self-consistency. Therefore, this section will focus on scoring methods.
4.1 Axioms of invariance with respect to the results matrix
Let O ∈ Rn×n be the matrix with all of its entries being zero.
Axiom 4.1. Symmetry (SYM) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let (N,R,M) ∈ Rn be
a ranking problem such that R = O. Scoring method f : Rn → Rn is symmetric if
fi(N,R,M) = fj(N,R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
According to symmetry, if all paired comparisons (but not necessarily all matches in
each round) between the players result in a draw, then all players will have the same
score.
Axiom 4.2. Inversion (INV ) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998): Let (N,R,M) ∈ Rn
be a ranking problem. Scoring method f : Rn → Rn is invertible if fi(N,R,M) ≥
fj(N,R,M) ⇐⇒ fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Inversion means that taking the opposite of all results changes the ranking accordingly.
It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and losses.
Corollary 4.1. Let f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method satisfying INV . Then for all
Xi, Xj ∈ N : fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M) ⇐⇒ fi(N,−R,M) < fj(N,−R,M).
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The following result has been already mentioned by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 150).
Corollary 4.2. INV implies SYM .
It seems to be difficult to argue against symmetry. However, scoring methods based on
right eigenvectors (Wei, 1952; Slutzki and Volij, 2005, 2006; Kitti, 2016) violate inversion.
4.2 Properties of independence
The next axiom deals with the effects of certain changes in the aggregated tournament
matrix A.
Axiom 4.3. Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let
(N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems and Xi, Xj, Xk, Xℓ ∈ N be four different
players such that (N,A) and (N,A′) are identical but akℓ 6= a
′
kℓ. Scoring method f : R
n →
R
n is called independent of irrelevant matches if fi(N,A) ≥ fj(N,A) ⇒ fi(N,A
′) ≥
fj(N,A
′).
IIM means that ’remote’ matches – not involving players Xi and Xj – do not affect
the pairwise ranking of players Xi and Xj .
Independence of irrelevant matches seems to be a powerful property. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.
(2014) state that ’when players have different opponents (or face opponents with different
intensities), IIM is a property one would rather not have’. Csato´ (2018b) argues on an
axiomatic basis against IIM .
The rounds of a given tournament can be grouped arbitrarily. Therefore, the following
property makes much sense.
Axiom 4.4. Order preservation (OP ) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈
Rn be two ranking problems where all players have played m matches and Xi, Xj ∈ N be
two different players. Let f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method such that fi(N,A) ≥ fj(N,A)
and fi(N,A
′) ≥ fj(N,A
′).3 f satisfies order preservation if fi(N,A+A
′) ≥ fj(N,A+A
′),
furthermore, fi(N,A+A
′) > fj(N,A+A
′) if fi(N,A) > fj(N,A) or fi(N,A
′) > fj(N,A
′).
OP is a relatively restricted version of combining ranking problems, which implies
that if player Xi is not worse than player Xj on the basis of some rounds as well as on
the basis of another set of rounds such that all players have played in each round (so they
have played the same number of matches altogether), then this pairwise ranking should
hold after the two distinct set of rounds are considered jointly.
One can consider a stronger version of order preservation, too.
Axiom 4.5. Strong order preservation (SOP ) (van den Brink and Gilles, 2009): Let
(N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two players. Let
f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method such that fi(N,A) ≥ fj(N,A) and fi(N,A
′) ≥
fj(N,A
′). f satisfies strong order preservation if fi(N,A + A
′) ≥ fj(N,A + A
′), further-
more, fi(N,A+ A
′) > fj(N,A+ A
′) if fi(N,A) > fj(N,A) or fi(N,A
′) > fj(N,A
′).
In contrast to order preservation, SOP does not contain any restriction on the number
of matches of the players in the ranking problems to be aggregated.
3 Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) formally introduce a stronger version of this axiom since only Xi and Xj
should have the same number of matches in the two ranking problems. However, in the counterexample
of Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014), which shows the violation of OP by several ranking methods, all players
have played the same number of matches.
7
Corollary 4.3. SOP implies OP .
It will turn out that the weaker property, order preservation has still unfavourable
implications.
4.3 Relations among the axioms
In this part, some links among symmetry, inversion, independence of irrelevant matches,
and (strong) order preservation will be revealed.
Remark 4.1. SYM and OP (SOP ) imply INV .
Proof. Consider a ranking problem (N,R,M) ∈ Rn where fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) for
players Xi, Xj ∈ N . If fi(N,−R,M) > fj(N,−R,M), then fi(N,O, 2M) > fj(N,O, 2M)
due to OP , which contradicts to SYM . So fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M) holds.
It turns out that IIM is also closely connected to SOP .
Proposition 4.1. A scoring method satisfying NEU , SYM and SOP meets IIM .
Proof. Assume to the contrary, and let (N,R,M) ∈ Rn be a ranking problem, f : Rn →
R
n be a scoring method satisfying NEU , SYM , and SOP , andXi, Xj, Xk, Xℓ ∈ N be four
different players such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M), and (N,R
′,M ′) ∈ Rn is identical
to (N,R,M) except for the result r′kℓ and number of matches m
′
kℓ between players Xk
and Xℓ, where fi(N,R
′,M ′) < fj(N,R
′,M ′).
According to Remark 4.1, f satisfies INV , hence fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M).
Denote by σ : N → N the permutation σ(Xi) = Xj, σ(Xj) = Xi, and σ(Xk) = Xk
for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}. Neutrality leads to in fi [σ(N,R,M)] ≤ fj [σ(N,R,M)], and
fi [σ(N,−R
′,M ′)] < fj [σ(N,−R
′,M ′)] due to inversion and Corollary 4.1. With the
notations R′′ = σ(R)− σ(R′)−R +R′ = O and M ′′ = σ(M) + σ(M ′) +M +M ′, we get
(N,R′′,M ′′) = σ(N,R,M) + σ(N,−R′,M ′) + (N,−R,M) + (N,R′,M ′).
Symmetry implies fi(N,R
′′,M ′′) = fj(N,R
′′,M ′′) since R′′ = O, but fi(N,R
′′,M ′′) <
fj(N,R
′′,M ′′) from strong order preservation, which is a contradiction.
It remains to be seen whether NEU , SYM , and SOP are all necessary for Proposi-
tion 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. NEU , SYM , and SOP are logically independent axioms with respect to
the implication of IIM .
Proof. It is shown that there exist scoring methods, which satisfy exactly two properties
from the set NEU , SYM , and SOP , but violate the third and does not meet IIM , too:
1 SYM and SOP : the sum of the results of the ’previous’ player, fi(N,R,M) =∑n
j=1 ri−1,j for all Xi ∈ N \ {X1} and f1(N,R,M) =
∑n
j=1 rn,j;
2 NEU and SOP : maximal number of matches of other players, fi(N,R,M) =
max{
∑n
k=1 mjk : Xj 6= Xi};
4
4 It is worth to note that the maximal number of own matches satisfies NEU , SOP , and IIM .
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3 NEU and SYM : aggregated sum of the results of opponents, fi(N,R,M) =∑
Xj∈Oi
∑n
k=1 rjk.
Proposition 4.1 helps in deriving another impossibility statement.
Proposition 4.2. There exists no scoring method that satisfies neutrality, symmetry,
strong order preservation and self-consistency.
Proof. According to Proposition 4.1, NEU , SYM and SOP imply IIM . Csato´ (2018b,
Theorem 3.1) has shown that IIM and SC cannot be met at the same time.
4.4 A basic impossibility result
The four axioms of Proposition 4.2 are not independent despite Lemma 4.1. However, a
much stronger statement can be obtained by eliminating neutrality and symmetry, which
also allows for a weakening of strong order preservation by using order preservation. Note
that substituting an axiom with a weaker one in an impossibility statement leads to a
stronger result.
We will use a generalized tournament with four players for this purpose.
Figure 2: The ranking problems of Example 4.1
(a) (N, R, M)
X1 X2
X3X4
(b) (N, R′, M ′)
X1 X2
X3X4
(c) (N, R + R′, M + M ′)
X1 X2
X3X4
Example 4.1. Let (N,R,M), (N,R′,M ′) ∈ R4 be two ranking problems. They are
shown in Figure 2: in the first tournament described by (N,R,M), matches between
playersX1 andX2, X1 andX4,X2 andX3, X3 andX4 all resulted in draws (see Figure 2.a).
On the other side, in the second tournament, described by (N,R′,M ′), players X1 and X2
have lost against X3 and drawn against X4 (see Figure 2.b). The two ranking problems
can be summed in (N,R′′,M ′′) ∈ R4 such that R′′ = R + R′ and M ′′ = M +M ′ (see
Figure 2.c).
Theorem 4.1. There exists no scoring method that satisfies order preservation and self-
consistency.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a self-consistent scoring method f : Rn →
R
n satisfying order preservation. Consider Example 4.1.
I. Take the ranking problem (N,R,M). Note that O1 = O3 = {X2, X4} and
O2 = O4 = {X1, X3}.
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a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h13 : O1 ↔ O3 and
h31 : O3 ↔ O1 such that h13(X2) = h31(X2) = X2 and h13(X4) =
h31(X4) = X4. Since r12 = r32 = 0 and r14 = r34 = 0, players X1 and X3
have the same results against the same opponents, hence f1(N,R,M) =
f3(N,R,M) from SC.
b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h24 : O2 ↔ O4 and
h42 : O4 ↔ O2. Since r21 = r41 = 0 and r23 = r43 = 0, players X2 and X4
have the same results against the same opponents, hence f2(N,R,M) =
f4(N,R,M) from SC.
c) Suppose that f2(N,R,M) > f1(N,R,M), which implies f4(N,R,M) >
f3(N,R,M). Consider the one-to-one mapping h12 : O1 ↔ O2, where
h12(X2) = X1 and h12(X4) = X3. Since r12 = r21 = 0 and r14 = r23 = 0,
player X1 has the same results against stronger opponents compared to
X2, hence f1(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M) from SC, which is a contradiction.
d) An analogous argument shows that f1(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M) cannot
hold.
Therefore, self-consistency leads to f1(N,R,M) = f2(N,R,M) = f3(N,R,M) =
f4(N,R,M) in the first ranking problem.
II. Take the ranking problem (N,R′,M ′). Note that O′1 = O
′
2 = {X3, X4} and
O′3 = O
′
4 = {X1, X2}.
a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h′12 : O
′
1 ↔ O
′
2 and
h′21 : O
′
2 ↔ O
′
1. Since r
′
13 = r
′
23 = −1 and r
′
14 = r
′
24 = 0, players
X1 and X2 have the same results against the same opponents, hence
f1(N,R
′,M ′) = f2(N,R
′,M ′) from SC.
b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondence h′34 : O
′
3 ↔ O
′
4. Since
1 = r′31 > r
′
41 = 0 and 1 = r
′
32 > r
′
42 = 0, player X3 has better res-
ults against the same opponents compared to X4, hence f3(N,R
′,M) >
f4(N,R
′,M) from SC.
Thus self-consistency leads to f1(N,R
′,M ′) = f2(N,R
′,M ′) and f3(N,R
′,M ′) >
f4(N,R
′,M ′) in the second ranking problem.
III. Take the sum of these two ranking problems, the ranking problem (N,R′′,M ′′).
Suppose that f1(N,R
′′,M ′′) ≥ f2(N,R
′′,M ′′). Consider the one-to-one mappings
g21 : O2 ↔ O1 and g
′
21 : O
′
2 ↔ O
′
1 such that g21(X1) = X2, g21(X3) = X4 and
g′21(X3) = X3, g
′
21(X4) = X4. Since r21 = r12 = 0, r23 = r14 = 0 and r
′
23 = r
′
13 =
−1, r′24 = r
′
14 = 0, player X2 has the same results against stronger opponents
compared to X1, hence f2(N,R
′′,M ′′) > f1(N,R
′′,M ′′) from SC, which leads to
a contradiction.
To summarize, self-consistency results in f1(N,R
′′,M ′) < f2(N,R
′′,M ′′), how-
ever, order preservation implies f1(N,R
′′,M ′′) = f2(N,R
′′,M ′′) as all players
have played two matches in (N,R′,M ′) and (N,R′,M ′), respectively, which is
impossible.
Therefore, it has been derived that no scoring method can meet OP and SC simul-
taneously on the universal domain of Rn.
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Theorem 4.1 is a serious negative result: by accepting self-consistency, the ranking
method cannot be required to preserve two players’ pairwise ranking when some ranking
problems, where all players have played the same number of matches, are aggregated.
Figure 3: The ranking problem of Example 4.2
X1 X2
X3X4
Example 4.2. Let (N,R,M) ∈ R4 be the ranking problem in Figure 3: X1 has drawn
against X2, X2 against X3 and X3 against X4.
Theorem 4.1 would be more straightforward as a strengthening of Proposition 4.2 if
self-consistency implies neutrality and/or symmetry. However, it is not the case as the
following result holds.
Remark 4.2. There exists a scoring method that is self-consistent, but not neutral and
symmetric.
Proof. The statement can be verified by an example where an SC-compatible scoring
method violates NEU and SYM .
Consider Example 4.2 with a scoring method f such that f1(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M) >
f3(N,R,M) > f4(N,R,M), for example, player Xi gets the score 4 − i. f meets self-
consistency since X1 has the same result against a stronger opponent compared to X4,
while there exists no correspondence between opponent sets O2 and O3 satisfying the
conditions of SC.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation such that σ(X1) = X4, σ(X2) = X3, σ(X3) =
X2, and σ(X4) = X1. Since σ(N,R,M) = (N,R,M), NEU implies f4(N,R,M) >
f1(N,R,M) and f3(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M), a contradiction. Furthermore, SYM leads
to f1(N,R,M) = f2(N,R,M) = f3(N,R,M) = f4(N,R,M), another impossibility.
Therefore there exists a self-consistent scoring method, which is not neutral and sym-
metric.
5 Conclusions
We have found some unexpected implications of different properties in the case of gener-
alized tournaments where the players should be ranked on the basis of their match results
against each other. First, self-consistency prohibits the use of individual scoring methods,
that is, scores cannot be derived before the aggregation of tournament rounds (Propos-
ition 3.1). Second, independence of irrelevant matches (posing a kind of independence
concerning the pairwise ranking of two players) follows from three axioms, neutrality (in-
dependence of relabelling the players), symmetry (implying a flat ranking if all aggregated
comparisons are draws), and strong order preservation (perhaps the most natural property
concerning the aggregation of ranking problems). According to Csato´ (2018b), there ex-
ists no scoring method satisfying self-consistency and independence of irrelevant matches,
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hence Proposition 4.1 implies that neutrality, symmetry, strong order preservation and
self-consistency cannot be met simultaneously (Proposition 4.2). It even turns out that
self-consistency and a weaker version of strong order preservation are still enough to de-
rive this negative result (Theorem 4.1), consequently, one should choose between these
two natural fairness requirements.
What do our results say to practitioners who want to rank players or teams? First,
self-consistency does not allow to rank them in individual rounds, one has to wait until
all tournament results are known and can be aggregated. Second, self-consistency is not
compatible with order preservation on this universal domain. It is not an unexpected
and counter-intuitive result as, according to Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014), a number of
ranking methods violate order preservation. We have proved that there is no hope to
find a reasonable scoring method with this property. From a more abstract point of view,
breaking of order preservation in tournament ranking is a version of Simpson’s paradox,
a phenomenon in probability and statistics, in which a trend appears in different groups
of data but disappears or reverses when these groups are combined.5 This negative result
holds despite self-consistency is somewhat weaker than our intuition suggests: it does not
imply neutrality and symmetry, so even a self-consistent ranking of players may depend
on their names and without ties if all matches are drawn (Remark 4.2). Third, losing
the simplicity provided by order preservation certainly does not facilitate the axiomatic
construction of scoring methods.
Consequently, while sacrificing self-consistency or order preservation seems to be un-
avoidable in our general setting, an obvious continuation of the current research is to get
positive possibility results by some domain restrictions or further weakening of the axioms.
It is also worth to note that the incompatibility of the two axioms does not imply that
any scoring method is always going to work badly, but all can lead to problematic results
at times.
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